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Stephen w. Farr, (#1042) and
G. Scott Jensen, (#4990) of
FARR, KAUFMAN, HAMILTON, PHILLIPS
SULLIVAN, GORMAN, & PERKINS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Bamberger Square, Building 1
205 26th Street, Suite 34
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-5526
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH OPHEIKENS, and
FANNY OPHEIKENS,
Plaintiffs/Appellants
vs.
:
ARTHUR C. SHERON and
BARBARA O. SHERON,

Case No. 880276

::

Priority No. 14(b).

Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred
upon the Supreme Court of Utah, pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, and § 78-2-2 (3)(f) of the Utah
Code Annotated 1988.

This is an appeal from a final judgement of

the Second Judicial District Court over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final order of the Second

Judicial

District Court of Weber County, rendered by the Honorable David
1

E. Roth sitting without a jury.

The trial court awarded the

Plaintiffs a life estate in their home and granted the Defendants
a remainder interest therein.

Plaintiffs are appealing the

judgement.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The Plaintiffs are appealing the judgement of the district
court citing the following grounds for appeal:
1.

That the trial court, after imposing a constructive trust,

abused its discretion by awarding a remainder interest in the
property to the Defendants.
2.

That the trial court abused its discretion by awarding a

remainder interest to the Defendants because the plaintiffs did
not request that they be granted a remainder interest in their
pleadings.
3.

That the Defendants presented insufficient evidence at trial

to justify the trial court's finding that they had equity in the
property sufficient to purchase a remainder interest therein.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 7, 1967, Joseph Opheikens and his wife Fannie,
signed a quit-claim deed to their home and real property located
at 141 Jefferson Avenue, consisting of Lots 14 and 15, Block 2,
Cropseys, addition to Ogden City, Utah, to their daughter and
son-in-law, Barbara 0. and Arthur C. Sheron as joint tenants.
(Exhibit D-l).
2

Plaintiffs allege that the quit-claim deed was to secure
payment on $1,028.00 loaned by the Sherons to the Opheikens
to pay delinquent property taxes on the Opheiken's home.
at 252.

loan
Record

The Defendants contend that at the time the quit-claim

deed was signed, the Opheikens intended to transfer ownership of
their home to the Sherons permanently rather than have the home
lost through foreclosure.

Record at 372.

The following brief history of the home and who contributed
to its construction is helpful in presenting a background of the
circumstances leading to this action.

The Opheiken's home was

built on land they purchased in 1932 for $500.00.

Record at 231.

In the early 1950's the Opheikens borrowed $2,150.00 from Mr. and
Mrs. William Holt to finance the construction of a new home on
their land.

Record at 233.

The $2,150.00 was not sufficient to

complete the construction so the Opheikens borrowed $4,500.00
from Froerer Realty to complete the house.

Record at 239.

In addition to the $4,500.00, Mrs. Opheikens testified that she
borrowed another $700.00 from Froerer for their kitchen cabinets.
Record at 239.
Arthur Sheron testified that he loaned the Opheikens $700.00
in approximately

1957, and that he borrowed

Beneficial Finance to loan to the Opheikens.

the Money

from

Mr. Sheron stated

that he did not know what the Opheikens intended to do with the
$700.00.
testified

Record at 364.

Upon cross-examination, Mrs. Opheikens

that the $700.00

that Mr. Sheron

borrowed

from

Beneficial Finance was used to purchase a 1955 Chevrolet, and
3

that the Opheikens never borrowed

$700.00 from the Sherons.

Record at 280.
At

trial

the Defendants testified

that they have made

substantial contributions to the construction of the Opheiken's
home,

in addition

to the $1,028.00 which they gave to the

Opheikens to pay the back taxes in 1967.
Fannie Opheikens testified

at trial that her daughter,

Defendant Barbara Sheron, gave the Plaintiffs $600.00 to help
build the house.

Fannie stated that of the $600.00 that Barbara

contributed, $200.00 was used to dig the foundation for the
house, and $400.00 was used to purchase lumber.

Record at 234.

Fannie testified that Barbara did not contribute any more than
$600.00 toward the construction of the home. Id.
Barbara Sheron testified that she contributed all of the
$1,900.00 insurance settlement which she received from the death
of her first husband.
of

any

Record at 316.

However, the only evidence

contribution made by Barbara Sheron to the

initial

construction of the house was a check for approximately $400.00
to Hurst Lumber.

Record at 336, and Exhibit P-14.

During the construction of the home, the Defendant, Barbara
Sheron, was one of three children living with the Opheikens after
being recently widowed when Jack Griven, her husband of a short
time, died

in an automobile accident.

Barbara received

an

insurance settlement of $1900.00 from her husband's death in
addition to $10,000.00 which she received from his life insurance
policy.

For ten years, Barbara received a monthly check of
4

$92,90 from her husband's life insurance policy, and $19.00 per
month as Social

Security benefits.

While

living

with

her

parents, Barbara gave her parents $100.00 per month from her
income.
After living with her parents for approximately one year,
Barbara married Arthur Sheron.

Barbara and her second husband

Arthur Sheron lived with the Opheikens for approximately three
months prior to moving into their own home on Second Street in
Ogden.

Mrs. Opheikens testified at trial that Barbara and Arthur

Sheron used the insurance money to make the payments on their
house on Second Street.

Record at 238.

At the time the quit-claim deed was signed in 1967, the
Opheikens had been making mortgage payments on their home since
approximately 1950.

Mrs. Opheikens testified at trial that at

the time the quit-claim deed was signed, the Opheikens had no
intention of transferring their interest in the property to the
Sherons.

Record at 260.

After the quit-claim deed was signed,

the Opheikens continued to make each and every payment on the
mortgage, taxes, utilities, insurance and any other assessments
until the final payment of $286.34 was made on June 31, 1977.
Record at 243.
The Opheikens testified that since the quit-claim deed was
signed they have made repeated offers to repay the $1,028.00 to
the

Sherons.

However, according

to the testimony of Mrs.

Opheikens, the Sheron's have refused to accept any money and have
refused to return the quit-claim deed.
5

Record at 244-45, 251-

52, 253.
Until approximately

1984, the Opheikens were unaware that

the Sherons claimed to own their property.

In about 1984,

according to the testimony of Mrs. Opheikens, she realized that
the Sherons were not going to willingly return the quit-claim
deed.

Record at 251, 253, 309-10.

When the Opheikens learned

that the Sherons intended to keep their home, they brought this
action.
At

trial, the Sherons claimed

to be the owners of the

property in fee simple pursuant to the quit-claim deed, and
that the Opheikens relinquished all right to ownership of their
home.

The Sherons's contend that they have allowed the Opheikens

to live in the home as a gesture of kindness, even though the
Opheikens have paid all taxes, mortgage payments, insurance,
utilities, property
property.

assessments, and

have maintained

the

Record at 3 72.

The Sheron's claimed, in addition to the money loaned for
back taxes and the money used during the construction of the
home, that they have done yard work, snow removal, lawn care, and
other odd jobs on the Opheikens property, for which they should
be reimbursed.

The Opheikens contended that the Sherons were not

entitled to be reimbursed for their help around the house because
the help was offered gratuitously at the time.
concurred.

Record at 472.

The trial court

At no time have the Sherons paid the

Opheikens any consideration approximating a reasonable purchase
price for the property.
6

This action was brought by the Opheikens against the Sherons
for breaching a fiduciary relationship.

At trial, the Opheikens

asked the court to impose a constructive trust thereby returning
the property to the Opheikens.

In its decision, the trial court

imposed a constructive trust.

The trial court also ruled that

Barbara and Arthur Sheron had contributed a total of $3628.00
which included;

(1) the $1028.00 used to pay the delinquent

taxes, (2) $1,900.00 allegedly given to the Opheikens by Barbara
Sheron

while

she was

living

with

her parents

during

the

construction of the home, and, (3) $700.00 given to the Opheikens
by Arthur Sheron.

Record at 472.

The trial court went on to hold that the $3628.00 was
sufficient to purchase a remainder interest in the property on
behalf of the Sherons with a life estate for the Opheikens.
Plaintiffs brought this appeal on the grounds that; (1) the
trial court improperly

awarded a remainder

interest to the

Defendants where the Defendants did not request a reminder
interest be applied in their pleadings, and (2) that Defendants
failed to present sufficient evidence as to the amount of money
contributed toward the property which was used as a basis for
awarding the remainder interest, and, (3) that there was not
sufficient evidence presented as to the value of the house to
establish whether the contribution

of

the Defendants

sufficient to purchase a remainder interest in the property.

7

was

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court abused its discretion
by imposing a remainder

interest on the property which was

returned to the Plaintiffs through a constructive trust.

By

imposing a remainder interest the court effectively nullified any
effect the constructive trust had on the parties transaction.
Plaintiffs further contend that because the Defendants did not
request in their pleadings that they be awarded a remainder
interest in the propertyf that the court acted outside the scope
of its authority by granting such relief.

Finally, Plaintiffs

argue that insufficient evidence was presented by the Defendants
to justify the trial court's award of a $3,628.00 interest in the
property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF A REMAINDER INTEREST
IN THE PROPERTY TO THE DEFENDANTS IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE IMPOSITION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST FOR
THE BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFFS.
A constructive trust is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary, as

The constructive t r u s t i s a t r u s t raised by
construction of law, or a r i s i n g by operation
of law, as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from an e x p r e s s
trust.
Where t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of a
t r a n s a c t i o n a r e such t h a t t h e person who
takes a legal e s t a t e in property cannot also
enjoy the b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t without
n e c e s s a r i l y v i o l a t i n g some e s t a b l i s h e d
p r i n c i p a l of e q u i t y , t h e c o u r t w i l l
immediately r a i s e a constructive t r u s t , and
8

fasten it upon the conscience of the legal
owner, so as to convert him into a trustee
for the parties who in equity are entitled to
the beneficial enjoyment.
Constructive trusts do not arise by agreement or
from intention, but by operation of law, and
fraud, active or constructive, is their essential
element, actual fraud is not necessary, but such a
trust will arise whenever circumstances under
which property was acquired made it inequitable
that it should be retained by him who holds the
legal title. Constructive trusts have been said
to arise through the application of equitable
estoppel, or under the broad doctrine that equity
regards and treats as done what in good conscience
ought to be done, and such trusts are also known
as 'trusts ex maleficio' or 'ex delicto' or
'involuntary trusts' and their forms and varieties
are practically without limit being raised by
courts of equity whenever it becomes necessary to
prevent a failure of justice."
Blacks Law
Dictionary, 1353 (5th Ed. 1979).
The very definition of the doctrine of a constructive trust
reveals the misapplication of the doctrine in the present case,
the above definition states that,
Where the circumstances of a transaction are such that
the person who takes a legal estate in property cannot
also enjoy the beneficial interest without necessarily
violating some established principal of equity, the
court will immediately raise a constructive trust, and
fasten it upon the conscience of the legal owner, so as
to convert him into a trustee for the parties who in
equity are entitled to the beneficial enjoyment.
Id., emphasis added.
The

trial

court

in

this

case, after

holding

constructive trust was applicable, effectively

that a

removed

any

equitable relief the trust may have had on the transaction by
granting the Defendants a remainder interest in the Opheikens
property.
Once a constructive trust has been imposed, the legal owner
9

under the quit-claim deed becomes a "trustee for the parties who
in equity are entitled to the beneficial enjoyment."

Id.

In

this case, the Sherons became the trustees for the Opheikens when
the trial court determined that the Plaintiffs had met the burden
of imposing a constructive trust.

When it was determined that

the Opheikens owed the Sherons for the money contributed to the
construction of the home, and for the money loaned to pay the
back taxes, then the Opheikens should have been ordered to repay
the Sherons, with a lien in the property as security.
Although the trial court has some amount of discretion in
forming an equitable remedy, by imposing a constructive trust, it
confined itself to a specific form of relief.

The effect of a

constructive trust is clear; to return ownership to the grantors.
By converting the Sherons from owners to trustees for the benefit
of the Opheikens, the court may not in equity then allow the
trustee to retain that which he has been entrusted to hold for
the other's benefit.
In Professor George Gleason Bogert's Handbook of the Law of
Trusts, 303 West Publishing, 5th ed. (1973), the author states
that,
If the grantee was in a confidential or fiduciary
relation with the grantor at the time of the deed
and the oral promise to hold in trust, the grantee
is usually made a constructive trustee for the intended
beneficiary of the oral trust on account of the wrong
involved in the violation of the relationship by
repudiation of the promise.
Professor Bogert illustrated the principle above with the
following example:
10

In England and a few American states it is held that
after the oral trustee has refused to carry out his
trust in reliance on the Statute of Frauds, if he
retains the property for himself he will be attempting
to enrich himself unjustly and to perpetrate a wrong on
the intended beneficiary and that he ought to be
charged as a constructive trustee for the intended
beneficiary, whether it be the grantor or a third
person. Id., at 305, citations omitted.
Professor Bogert further clarifies the effect of the
imposition a constructive trust:
The constructive trust would be a mere passive trust,
on the b a s i s of w h i c h equity w o u l d d e c r e e a
reconveyance of the property to the settlor. It
would require a grantee pleading voidability of his
oral p r o m i s e to hold in trust to r e t u r n the
consideration which he received for making such a
promise"] It would require him to restore the grantor
to his "former position,...1 Id., emphasis addecT
Clearly, the imposition of a constructive trust has the
effect of a "reconveyance" of the property and to "restore the
grantor to his former position."
In the present case the trial court, by granting a remainder
interest to the Sherons has not made a clean "reconveyance" or
"restore"

the Opheikens

to their

"former position."

The

Opheikens former position was that of title in fee simple subject
to a mortgage.
became

After the trial court's ruling the Opheikens

life tenants with a remainder

interest going to the

Sherons.
In order to find that a constructive trust is an appropriate
remedy, the trial court must find among other things that:
1.
property.

The Plaintiffs must have an equitable interest in the
Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 600

(Utah 1983) .
11

2.

That there will be unjust enrichment if the constructive

trust is not imposed Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d
590, 600 (Utah 1983) .
To hold on one hand that the Opheikens have an "equitable
interest" in the property, and that the element of

"unjust

enrichment" is present, and then to hold that the Defendants are
entitled to a remainder interest in the property is inconsistent
with doctrine of constructive trusts.
The

trial

court

found

that

there

was

insufficient

consideration to purchase the property pursuant to the quit-claim
deed, and to do so would unjustly

enrich

the

Defendants.

Therefore, the trial court imposed a constructive trust.

To hold

that unjust enrichment mandates the imposition of a constructive
trust, then to allow the Defendants to keep the property would be
contradictory.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING
A REMAINDER INTEREST TO THE DEFENDANTS WHERE
RELIEF WAS NOT REQUESTED IN THE PLEADINGS.

SUCH

At no point in the pleadings did the Defendants claim that
they held a remainder interest in the property, or that they
should be made remaindermen.

The trial court, in an effort to

compensate the Sherons for the money loaned to the Opheikens,
removed any hope the Opheikens may have had of having their home
back, even if they paid the Defendants all monies to which they
are entitled.
12

Because the issue of a remainder was never raised in the
pleadings by either party, the Plaintiffs were not prepared to
argue

at trial

that there was or was not sufficient money

transacted to purchase a remainder interest in the property.
There are numerous cases standing for the proposition that
a trial court is not authorized to grant relief on issues neither
raised in the pleadings nor tried.
P.2d

890, 893

See, Cornia v. Cornia, 546

(Utah 1976); Alley v. Peeso, 290 P. 238, 241-42

(Oregon 1930); See also, Strout v. Burgess, 68 A.2d 241, 12
A.L.R. 939.
Clearly this case has some findings that are at variance
with the claims of both parties, and where such is the case, the
findings will be carefully scrutinized on review.

See, West v.

West, 403 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1965).
Although the trial court in forming an equitable remedy is
allowed considerable discretion, to attach a remainder interest
for the benefit of the Defendants, removes the possibility the
Plaintiffs may have had to repay the money which they owe to the
Defendants and have clear title to their home.
Where the issue of a remainder interest was not raised in
the pleadings, or during the trial, both parties were unprepared
to put on evidence as to the value of the property for such a
purpose.

13

POINT III
IN THE EVENT THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING
A REMAINDER INTEREST TO FOLLOW THE IMPOSITION
OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE THAT
THE EVIDENCE AS TO THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY,
AND THE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE DEFENDANTS
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT'S
AWARD OF A REMAINDER INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.
At trial no evidence was put on by either of the parties as
to the approximate value of the property in dispute.

For the

trial court to find that the $3,628.00 was sufficient to purchase
a remainder interest in the property, which the trial court
estimated to be worth $15,000.00, is without a foundation.
The home is worth much more that $15,000.00 by today's
prices, and was worth more that $15,000.00 in 1967 as stated by
the Defendant Barbara Sheron who believed the house and property
were worth approximately sixty to seventy thousand dollars at the
time the quit-claim deed was signed in 1967.

Record at 359.

The

trial court stated the following regarding the value of the home:
The Plaintiffs did not present evidence of value.
And I know the Plaintiffs have a burden in that
regard to prove unjust enrichment. That other houses
in the area were selling in the fifties and sixties for
very modest amounts.
I cannot find that they are
comparable sales because I don't have the information.
But based upon all the information I have, and finding
that the Defendants contributed between three and four
thousand dollars at a time when both Defendants, sic
Plaintiffs , who were in their late fifties, both 59
years old, both have lived 39 years, my own experience
is that people of that age have a life expectancy of
twenty years or longer; three or four thousand dollars
to buy a remainder interest in property valued at
$15,000.00, the likelihood of realizing it twenty plus
years down the road is not unjust. Record at 473.
As the trial court stated in its decision, the Plaintiffs
14

did not put on evidence as to the exact value of the property.
No appraisal was done.

However, the trial court accepted

the

evidence introduced by the Plaintiffs establishing that there was
sufficient

equity

in the property

to establish

that

the

Defendants would be unjustly enriched if allowed to keep the
property subject to the quit-claim deed.

The only estimate as to

the approximate value of the property at the time the deed was
signed was given by the Defendant Barbara Sheron, she stated that
she believed the property to be worth approximately sixty or
seventy thousand dollars in December of 1967.

At the time of the

trial the Plaintiffs did not attempt to establish the exact value
of the house, only that there was sufficient equity in the house
establish unjust enrichment.

From the trial court's decision, it

is clear that the Plaintiffs met their burden of proof.
trial court followed the standard set forth in

The

Parks v. Zions

First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, (Utah 1983) where this Court
held that where a substantial part of the marital estate was
acquired from the husband's earnings, there was sufficient basis
for holding that the Plaintiff had an equitable interest in the
property.
actual

Under the Parks standard, it is not necessary to show

value, only

that

there

is an

"equitable interest"

sufficient to amount to an "unjust enrichment" of the Defendant.
Regarding

the

evidence

of money

contributed

to

the

construction of the home by the Defendants, the Defendants showed
no receipts, or any record of any of their alleged contributions.
Clearly, the evidence presented at the trial was insufficient to
15

establish that the Defendants contributed $lf900.00 plus $700.00
prior to 1967.

Because it is so easy to verify whether the

Defendant took out a loan from Beneficial for $700.00 and to
learn what the loan was used for, the issue of damages should be
remanded to the trial court for more in depth consideration.
The evidence which the Plaintiffs allege was not

presented

sufficiently was:
a.

The value of the property was never established.

b.

No receipts were provided by Defendants to substantiate

any of the Defendant's claims regarding contributions to the
construction of the home.
c.

No records

were

provided

regarding

the

loan from

Beneficial Finance that Arthur Sheron testified he took out for
$700.00 which he stated he loaned to the Opheikens, and which the
Opheikens testified he used to buy a car.

CONCLUSION
The primary reason the Opheikens brought this action was to
retain the right to determine to whom their life earnings would
pass at their death.

At no time have the Sherons asked their

parents to leave their home.

From the time the quit-claim deed

was signed in 1967, it has been understood that the Opheikens
would live out their lives in the home.

The Opheikens brought

this action to retain the right to pass on their home to the
heirs of their choice, not merely to live out their lives in the
home.

To deny the Opheikens the right to pass their home on to
16

the heirs of their choice, the court would remove any benefit a
constructive trust would impose.

In short, the trial court's

remedy does not allow the Plaintiffs the option of paying back
the Sherons and retaining their house, which is the only reason
they petitioned the trial court to impose a constructive trust.

ADDENDUM
No addendum is attached because all references are to the
Record.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of December, 1988.

STEPHEN W. FARR

G. SCOTT JENSEN

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, on this
day of December, 1988, to the following:
ROBERT A. ECHARD #9 53
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 801-621-3317

Secretary
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